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Abstract
Until now most research in dynamic games focus on models with quadratic
objective functions because of practical considerations. But in reality, all
problems are not quadratic. In this paper, we solve a di®erential game
where players have non-quadratic preferences. In particular we consider an
institutional game governing a permanent interaction between civil society
organizations and Government in the economy in the presence of corruption.
At the ¯rst stage, we compute analytically and solve numerically the open
loop and cooperative outcome of the di®erential game. At the second stage,
we approximated analytically and solved numerically the feedback strategies
at equilibrium. As results, we found that both open loop and cooperative so-
lution are unique and stable while multiple feedback Nash equilibria should
arise. As economic implications, we found that under cooperative play the
magnitude of the civil monitoring e®ort is lower than the one in open loop
game. This in turn is smaller than the magnitude of e®ort associated to the
best feedback equilibrium. Total factor productivity e®ects always dominate
the detrimental e®ect of individual e®ort devoted to production in almost
all situations. Furthermore, institutions improve much faster under cooper-
ative scenario than in open loop game. These results have a similar format
with the ones obtained under linear quadratic di®erential game at least for
open loop and cooperative games.
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11 Introduction
There has been considerable use of di®erential games in analyzing economic
problems. Many areas such environmental economics namely pollution prob-
lems and resources management, lobbying activities, industrial organization,
etc are concerned. In dynamic game, information available to players at the
time of their decisions matters. Two major cases are distinguished in non
cooperative games: Open loop information versus Feedback information.
We based ourselves on Basar and Olsder (1982). Following these authors,
open loop and feedback nash solutions di®er by their information structure.
Under open loop information structure, all players know just the initial state
of the process and the game structure. It is assumed that players simultane-
ously determine their actions for the whole planning horizon of the process
before it starts. Binding commitments are required to avoid any deviation
during the evolution of the process. Then, open loop solution depends on
time and initial state of the system. It assumes precommittement of players
and is weakly time-consistent since players can deviate during the game.
In contrast, feedback information structure allows all players to observe at
every point in time the current state of the process and determine their
actions based on this observation. Then, feedback controls depend on time
and current state. They are time-consistent and the markov subagme per-
fectness property holds. Additionally, Basar and Olsder (1982), and in the
same line, Kossioris et al (2008) state that if the time variable does not
appear explicitly in the model (except in discounting factor), the model
is autonomous (time invariant) and optimal solution is time-stationary. It
is convenient to add the cooperative mood in dynamic games despite the
di±culty to justify it in some con°ict games. Under the cooperation sce-
nario, players communicate and agree to cooperate in order to achieve their
objectives.
Several studies in di®erential games extensively focus on problems with
quadratic objectives (as pay-o®s of players) and linear state system. The so-
called " Linear Quadratic Di®erential Games". This formulation helps ana-
lytical tractability in particular for computing the Feedback strategies. Non
quadratic structure brings more di±culties in solving a di®erential game.
Under quadratic di®erential games, ¯ndings have almost similar format. On
one side, some studies pointed out the existence and uniqueness of both
Open loop and feedback equilibrium (Wirl, 94; Piga, 2000 ). On the other
side, without boundary condition, multiple feedback Nash equilibria may
exist [Dockner et al (1993), Kossioris et al ( 2008)]. This multiplicity arises
the question of selecting the best feedback Nash equilibrium. Kossioris et al
(2008) introduce non-linearities in dynamic state equation and consider the
steady state as a boundary condition. In sum, due to practical considera-
tions, numerous studies in dynamic games focus on models with quadratic
preferences as payo®s of players.
2In this work, we model permanent interaction between Government and
Civil society as an institutional di®erential game. The novelty of the work is
that we model this dynamic interaction under linear non quadratic structure
i.e non quadratic objectives functions and linear state equation. Clearly, we
will consider logarithmic preferences and show that by using linear approx-
imation around the steady state, we can handle analytically the markovian
strategies for this di®erential game. Before solving numerically the feed-
backs, we will compute analytically the properties of existence of the feed-
back solutions. Open loop and cooperative outcomes are taken in this frame-
work as benchmark solutions. In our previous work (Ngendakuriyo , 2009),
we solved a dynamic institutional game between a corrupt government and
an active civil society under linear quadratic structure. Civil society had
two strategies: voice or loyalty. On its side, Government could repress
or tolerate any attempt at revolt by handling its punishment mechanisms.
When an active civil society faces an unrestrictive or passive government,
we model this interaction as a one player di®erential game or a simple op-
timal control. However, if the corrupt government is an oppressive one,
the two-player game takes place. Theoretical results show that open loop
Nash equilibrium and cooperative outcome are both unique and stable sad-
dle point. This technical note aims to investigate if the properties of the
equilibrium (existence, uniqueness and stability of the open loop Nash and
cooperative outcome) are preserved under nonquadratic preferences.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the
structure of the game and section 3 the model of competitive play (open
loop game) while section 4 is devoted to the model of cooperative interac-
tion. In the section 5, we attempt to compute the feedback solutions and
section 6 concludes.
2 Structure of the game
We construct a two-agent di®erential game in which an active civil soci-
ety faces an authoritarian government which make pressure on civil society
organizations in order to reinforce its corruption technology. Time is con-
tinuous and the game is played on in¯nite horizon between a representative
consumer and Government in one developing economy. We assume that the
representative consumer is a member of civil society and then spend a part
of her time on monitoring activities and the other part of time is devoted
to production sector. Total amount of time is normalized to one such that
L = 1 ¡ w where w is the consumer's monitoring e®ort and L the labor
supply. Government is a quasi-unique employer and is a corrupt entity who
3exerts pressures on civil society to halt monitoring. We assume that gov-
ernment obtains, per unit of output Yt, the rent Á = Á(x;w) depending
negatively on the civil e®ort w and positively on the pressure x it exerts
to civil society. Formally, Áx > 0 and Áw < 0. However, the Government
supports the costs by implementing and enforcing the sanctioning mecha-
nisms. Let us name g(x) the cost function which is increasing and convex:
gx > 0 and gxx ¸ 0. The representative consumer receives the amount
Ct = (1 ¡ Á(x;w))Yt and Government the amount of rent Gt = Á(xt;wt)Yt.
The production function where only labor L is a production factor is the
following: Yt = AtF(L), where At is the total factor productivity. Total
factor productivity is modeled as a function of the institutional quality It
and other variables zt interacting in the economy. Brie°y, we maintain the
same framework as in Ngendakuriyo (2009) except the fact that we consider
now non-quadratic objective functions in the controls xt and wt.
In summary, each player is choosing his strategy in order to maximize
the present value of net bene¯ts over an in¯nite time horizon, strategies of




exp(¡½t)[U(Á(xt;wt)Yt) ¡ g(xt)]dt; (1)




exp(¡½t)U((1 ¡ Á(xt;wt)Yt))dt;0 · wt · 1 (2)
subject to
_ It = bwt ¡ ±It; (3)
I(0) = I0 is given.
3 Open loop equilibrium
It is well known that open loop Nash equilibrium in two-players di®erential
game is obtained by solving two optimal control problems. The current-
value Hamiltonian H for government's problem is given by
H = U(Á(xt;wt)Yt) ¡ g(x) + ´(bwt ¡ ±It) (4)
where ´ is the costate variable. The necessary optimality conditions are
given by
4Hx ´ UGÁxY ¡ gx = 0; (5)
HI ´ ½´ ¡ _ ´ = UGÁAIF(L) ¡ ±´; (6)
H´ ´ _ I = bwt ¡ ±I: (7)
The augmented lagrangian function associated to consumer's problem
can be written as
L = U((1 ¡ Á(xt;wt)Yt)) + ¸t(bwt ¡ ±It) + ¹1twt + ¹2t(1 ¡ wt) (8)
and the corresponding necessary conditions for interior solution are
Lw ´ ¡UcÁ0(w)Y ¡ Uc(1 ¡ Á(w))AF0
L + ¸b = 0; (9)
LI ´ ½¸ ¡ _ ¸ = (1 ¡ Á(w))UcF(1 ¡ w)AI ¡ ±¸; (10)
L¸ ´ _ I = bw ¡ ±I: (11)
Open loop strategies require that Hx = 0 and Lw = 0 hold simulta-
neously. As we seek for explicit solutions, it is convenient to specify the
functional forms to be used in modeling this interaction. We take loga-
rithmic utility functions for consumers and Government coupled with linear
corruption technology and a linear cost function for implementing the gov-
ernmental hostility. We use an AK type production function and a linear
function of total factor productivity with respect to institutions. Concretely,
we consider the following functions:
U(Ct) = lnCt = ln[(1 ¡ Á(xt;wt))Yt]; (12)
U(Gt) = lnGt = ln[Á(xt;wt)Yt]; (13)
Á(xt;wt) = ·(1 ¡ wt + xt); (14)
g(xt) = ®xt; (15)
Yt = AtLt = At(1 ¡ wt); (16)
At = zt(A0 + It);A0 > 0: (17)
Reasonably, we can de¯nes the exogenous parameter · as the capacity
of the government to extract rents. It captures the scale of corruption in the
economy. The coe±cient ® is the marginal cost the government supports in
implementing one additional unit of pressures or intimidations on civil soci-
ety organizations. ® and · represent two opposite forces which in°uence the
choices of players. We allow poor institutions (It ! 0) to have a low level of
total factor productivity equating A0. Given the explicit functions above,
5problems (1) and (2) respectively can be summarized as follows. Govern-













subject to (3) and where 0 < w < 1.
Proposition 1: Under logarithmic preferences and linear cost function
for implementing governmental hostility, there exists at least one open loop
Nash equilibrium (w¤;x¤) such that 0 < w¤ < 1 for · <
®(A0(± + ½) ¡ b)
(1 + ®)A0(± + ½) ¡ b
.
For A0 small enough, the open loop nash equilibrium exists if and only if
· < ®. Furthermore, this equilibrium is unique and displays a stable saddle
point.
Proof. Under the above functional forms, Pontryagin's maximum prin-
ciple (5) - (7) can be rewritten as
Hx ´
1
(1 ¡ w + x)
¡ ® = 0; (20)
H´ ´ _ I = bw ¡ ±I; (21)




Following the Mangasarian su±ciency theorem, these necessary condi-
tions will also be su±cient for maximization of the Hamiltonian if it is
jointly concave in both the state and control variables. This requires that
the 2 X 2 Hessian matrix, comprising the second order partial derivatives of
the Hamiltonian with respect to the state and control variables, is negative
semi-de¯nite. The negative semi-de¯niteness is well established since the
principal minors have discriminants that alternate in sign and the ¯rst one














6It follows that the ¯rst principal minor is j M1 j= ¡
1
(1 ¡ w + x)2 < 0
and the second one is j M2 j=
1
(1 ¡ w + x)2(A0 + I)2 > 0. Hence, the nec-
essary conditions (20) - (22) are also su±cient for a maximum.
For the representative consumer, the necessary optimality conditions (9)
- (11) for interior solution can be rewritten as
Lw ´
2·(1 ¡ w) ¡ 1 + ·x
(1 ¡ ·(1 ¡ w + x))(1 ¡ w)
+ ¸b = 0; (23)




L¸ ´ _ I = bw ¡ ±I: (25)














implying that the above necessary conditions are also su±cient for a maxi-
mum since the requirement for negative semi-de¯niteness is veri¯ed.
Let us determine that equilibrium. The equations (20) and (23) consitute
a system of equations whose solutions give the open loop Nash equilibrium.
Then, solving equation (20) for x and substituting the result in the equation
(23) yield




(1 + ®)· ¡ ® ¡ ®·w
(® ¡ ·)(1 ¡ w)
+ b¸ = 0: (27)
At steady state _ ¸ = _ ´ = _ I = 0 and it follows that
¸¤ = ´¤ =
1






7Since we know that at steady state, the costate ¸ is a function of w, the
expression (27) can be rewritten as
(1 + ®)· ¡ ® ¡ ®·w
(® ¡ ·)(1 ¡ w)
+
b
(± + ½)(A0 + b
±w)
= 0: (30)
Denote the left hand side of expression (30) as P(w) which is a second-
order polynomial function in w. To prove existence and uniqueness of the
Open loop Nash Equilibrium, we apply jointly the intermediate values and
bijection theorems on the equation (30) on the interval ]0;1[. In particular
and simple words, these theorems state that if a function f is continuous and
strictly monotonic on the interval J =]a;b[ and if f(a)f(b) < 0, thus the
equation f(x) = 0 admits a unique solution on J. This result implicitly re-
quires that the null element belongs to the interval ]f(a);f(b)[ for increasing
function or ]f(b);f(a)[ in case of decreasing function; while f(a) and f(b)
have opposite sign2. Accordingly and from equation (30), it follows that
P(0) =






P(1) = ¡1: (32)
Furthermore, the function P(w) is strictly decreasing since
P0(w) = ¡
1
(w ¡ 1)2 ¡
±b2
(bw + A0±)2(± + ½)
< 0;8w 2]0;1[ (33)
We can state that there exists one and only one solution w¤ such that
0 < w¤ < 1 if and only if P(0)P(1) < 0. This condition requires that
P(0) > 0, which is the case if and only if · <
®(A0(± + ½) ¡ b)
A0(± + ½)(1 + ®) ¡ b
. For A0
small enough, P(0) > 0 for all · < ®. Additionally, the function P(w) is
strictly monotonic on the interval ]0;1[. By this, we had proven the exis-
tence and uniqueness of the equilibrium (w¤;x¤). At steady state, the open
loop Nash equilibrium is obtained by solving the system of equations (26) -
(27) as follows
2Intermediate Values Theorem states that if a function f is continuous on the interval
J =]a;b[, then for all real ® 2]f(a);f(b)[, there exists at least a real ¯ 2 J such that f(¯) =
". Accordingly, the equation f(x) = " admits at least one solution on J. Furthermore,
from the bijection theorem, we learn that if a function f is di®erentiable (thus continuous)
and strictly monotonic on the interval J =]a;b[, then for any real ® 2]f(a);f(b)[, the
equation f(x) = ® admits one and only one solution on J.
8w = 1 +
· ¡ ®
®· + b(® ¡ ·)¸
(34)




Replacing ¸ by its steady state value in the equation (34); we obtain the
following stationnary solutions determining the Open-loop Nash equilibrium
of this game:
w¤ =
¡b2±(® ¡ ·) ¡ A0®±·(± + ½) + b±(®(· ¡ 1) + ·)(± + ½) + £
2b·(± + ½)
; (36)







4b®±·(± + ½)(b2(® ¡ ·) + A0(®(· ¡ 1) + ·)(± + ½)) + ¥
with ¥ = (b2±(® ¡ ·) + A0®±·(± + ½) ¡ b(®(· ¡ 1) + ·)(± + ½))2
Corollary: An increase in marginal cost ® will reduce both the ef-
fort devoted by individuals to improving institutions and the amount of
governmental hostility: @w¤
@® < 0 and @x¤
@® < 0. Furthermore, an increase
in · constrains individuals to invest more e®ort in civil society activities:
@w¤
@· > 0. It can also be noted that when the marginal cost for implementing
punishment mechanisms equals one; the amount of civil monitoring e®ort
equals exactly the amount of governmental pressure at steady state. This
result is compatible to the ¯ndings of Acemoglu and Robinson (2008).
We now study the stability of this open loop nash equilibrium in the
state-costate space, (I;´;¸). The equations (21), (22) and (24) constitute
the dynamic system of the game and expressing them in terms of (I;¸;´)
leads to:
_ I = b(
® ¡ ·
¡®· + ¸b(· ¡ ®)
+ 1) ¡ ±I; (38)
















(®· + b¸¤(® ¡ ·))2
1
(A0 + I¤)2 (± + ½) 0
1










(A0 + I¤)2(2± + ½)2(®2·2 + b2(® ¡ ·)2¸2) + ¢
(A0 + I¤)(®· + b(® ¡ ·)¸)
)
»3 = ± + ½
where ¢ = 2b(® ¡ ·)(¡2· + ®(2 + (A0 + I¤)2·¸(2± + ½)2))
It follows that the unique open loop Nash equilibrium is a stable saddle
point since one eigenvalue is negative whereas the others are positive. ¥
Let us now numerically determine the open loop Nash equilibrium and
do sensitivity analysis for ·. We take the following values: z = 1;A0 = ± =
0:1;b = 0:5. Those values are chosen in light of conditions to be met for
existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium. For the discount rate, we take
½ = 0:08 according to existing literature in di®erential games3. The most
values used in the literature vary between 0:03 to 0:10. We will maintain
this parameterization value along our work.
We consider ¯rst the simple case when ® = 1. Given the parameters
of the model, ¯gure 1 shows that the equilibrium exists and is unique since
the function P(w) intersects once the X-axis. An increase in · shifts the
curve P(w) to the right meaning that both the civil monitoring e®ort and
the governmental hostility increases also.
As indicated in the Table 1 in appendix, the steady state values of the
institutional quality I¤ always increase after an increase of the government's
capacity to create rent ·. For the optimal output, there exists a threshold
value ¹ · under which optimal output increases. Above this value, output at
steady state decreases. Therefore, for · < ¹ · = 0:5, total factor productivity
e®ects dominate the direct detrimental e®ects of the civil society activities.
If · > ¹ ·, total factor productivity e®ets are dominated as illustrated in ¯g-
ure 2. In absolute value, the speed of convergence to long run equilibrium
decreases meaning that institutions deteriorate as · increases.
3 In the literature, we can cite some authors who calibrate the discount factor. Kossioris
et al (2000): 0.03; List and Mason (2001): 0.04; Kunkel and Vondem Hagen (2000): 0.08










Figure 1: Sensitivity analysis of ·: from the left to the right, the three
curves are such that · equals respectively 0.1; 0.5 and 0.7;civil monitoring
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Figure 2: ¹ · is the value of · which maximizes the output. Under ¹ ·, TFP







Figure 3: From the right to the left, the two curves illustrate the cases when
® = 0:2 and 1:2. Individual e®ort decreases as ® increases.
Taking any value of ® and allowing it to increase for ¯xed ·, namely
· = 0:1, yield following impacts (see Table 4 in appendix): Optimal civil
monitoring e®ort as well as optimal institutional quality and output will de-
crease, so that total factor productivity e®ects dominate. Speed of conver-
gence in absolute value will increase meaning that institutions will improve
themselves. Governmental pressures decrease as it is costly to implement
punishment mechanisms. These implications are plausible: consumers know
that government's dignitaries support high cost in implementing pressures
and accordingly they decrease their time devoted to monitoring activities.
Note that when we take low or high value of ·, the results are not altered.
4 Cooperative arrangement
Intuitively, the competitive play between the government and the civil so-
ciety in corruption ¯eld can lead the government to search of a negotiated
solution. Indeed, by mobilizing the opinion against the corrupt government,
the civil society can push this one to calm the anger of the population by
cooperating with her. In a nutshell, government's fear to lose the power
can increase its willingness to cooperate. Furthermore, Governance refers
to the role of citizens in the policy process and how groups within a society
organize to make and implement decisions on matters of great concern as
pointed out by Brinkerho® (1999). He stipulates that, in the developing
countries, democratic governance will take place through the State-Civil so-
ciety networks which can be de¯ned as cross-sectoral collaborations whose
purpose is to achieve convergent objectives through the combined e®orts of
both sets of actors, but where the respective roles and responsibilities of the
12actors involved remain distinct. The cooperation way is also possible in our
framework since the interactions between the state and the civil society may
generate positive synergistic e®ects in ¯ghting rent seeking activities. The
cooperative strategies are pareto optimal. Thus, the objective function to




exp(¡½t)f(1¡¼)U(Ct)+¼[U(Gt)¡g(xt)]gdt;0 < w < 1 (41)
subject to (3) and where ¼ is the cooperation weight of the Government.
The augmented lagragian function to be maximized is written as follows4
L = (1¡¼)U(Ct)+¼[U(Gt)¡g(xt)]+¸t(bwt¡±It)+¹1twt+¹2t(1¡wt) (42)
Proposition 2:Under logarithmic preferences and linear cost for im-
plementing governemental hostility, there exists a unique Pareto strategy
(w¤;x¤) such that 0 < w¤ < 1 and this stationary solution is a stable saddle
point.
Proof. Pontryagin's maximum principle yields the necessary conditions
for interior solution
¼(w ¡ 1) + (w ¡ 1 ¡ x)[1 ¡ 2· + 2·w ¡ x· + b(w ¡ 1)(1 + (¡1 + w ¡ x)·)¸]




1 ¡ w + x
) +
·(¼ ¡ 1)
1 + (w ¡ 1 ¡ x)·
= 0(44)
_ I = bw ¡ ±I(45)




At this stage, we look for solutions to euler equations (43) and (44).
Solving the equation (44) and substituting the result in equation (43) lead
to
x =
· + ®¼(1 + 2(w ¡ 1)·) +
p
¼2®(® ¡ 4·) + 2¼®· + ·2
2¼®·
; (47)
1 + (b¸ ¡ ¼®)(w ¡ 1)
w ¡ 1
= 0; (48)
4Recall that U(Ct) = ln[zt(A0 + It)(¡·w
2
t + (2· ¡ 1)wt + ·xtwt ¡ ·xt + 1 ¡ ·)] and
U(Gt) = ln[·zt(A0 + It)(w
2
t ¡ 2wt ¡ xtwt + xt ¡ 1)]
13Solving expression (48) for w implies that




Let us denote the left hand side of the equation (48) by F(w). Knowing
that at steady state ¸¤ =
1
(± + ½)(A0 + I¤)
and I¤ = b










One can observe that F(1) = ¡1 and F(0) = ¡1¡¼®+ b
A0(±+½). Then,
applying the intermediate values and bijection theorems, we can assert that
F(0) and F(1) have opposite sign if and only if F(0) > 0 which is the case for
¼ <
b ¡ A0(± + ½)
A0(± + ½)®
. Furthermore, the function F(w) is strictly monotonic
on the interval ]0;1[ since
F0(w) = ¡
1
(w ¡ 1)2 ¡
±b2
(bw + A0±)2(± + ½)
< 0;8w 2]0;1[ (51)
Accordingly, the cooperative outcome (w¤;x¤) exists and is unique. It
can be explicitly computed by solving the expression (50) for w, and using
(47). After some algebra, one ¯nd the following optimal strategies under
cooperation
w¤ =
¡b½ + ¼®(b ¡ A0±)(± + ½) +
p




· + ®¼(1 + 2(w¤ ¡ 1)·) +
p
¼2®(® ¡ 4·) + 2¼®· + ·2
2¼®·
;(53)
where ¡ = (A0¼®±(± + ½) + b(½ ¡ ¼®(± + ½)))2.
Corollary: An increase in the cooperation weight of the government will








Knowing (52) and (53) enables us to compute the equilibrium (w¤;I¤;¸¤).
Let us now study the stability of this equilibrium in the space (I;¸). Plug-
ging (49) in equation (45), the dynamic system (45) - (46) is expressed in












This jacobian matrix evaluated at steady state displays two eigenvalues
with opposite sign. Indead, we obtain the following characteristic polyno-
mial
º2 ¡ ½º ¡ ±(± + ½) ¡
b2
(¼® ¡ b¸¤)2(A0 + I¤)2 = 0 (54)






(¼® ¡ b¸¤)2(A0 + I¤)2(2± + ½)2) + 4b2
(¼® ¡ b¸¤)(A0 + I¤)
): (55)
Thus, the cooperative outcome is a stable saddle point as º1 is negative
and º2 positive. ¥
For given parameters, numerical cooperative solution is derived. This so-
lution is unique since the function F(w) has one intersection with the X-axis
on the interval ]0;1[. The crucial parameter is inescapably the cooperation
weight ¼. Firstly, we set ® = 1. Figure 4 shows that an increase in ¼ will
shifts F(w) to the left, logically implying that both civil monitoring e®ort
and governmental pressure decrease as pointed out by table 3 in appendix.
The speed of convergence in absolute value increases while, however,
both the optimal institutional quality and output decreases. Total factor
productivity e®ects dominate. Let us now consider the case where ® can
take any positive value under ¯xed level of willingness of government to
cooperate5. Following the results reported in table 4 in appendix, we see
that as ® increases, both the civil monitoring e®ort and the governmental
hostility at steady state decrease. The environment becomes hostile to gov-
ernmental corruption.
We observe however a decrease in optimal institutional quality and out-
put at steady state. Total factor productivity e®ects dominate. In contrast
the speed of convergence to long run equilibrium increase.
5Fixing ¼ and ½ at low or high level do not change the trend of the results, except the








Figure 4: As ¼ increases (¼ = 0:1;0:3 and 0:7) civil monitoring e®ort de-








Figure 5: An increase in® (® takes the following values: 0:2 and 1:2) will
decrease the amount individuals devote to civil society activities. Again, the
curve of the function F(w) shifts leftward.
165 Feedback Nash Equilibrium
In this section, we analyze the game by deriving the feedback strategies for
the two control variables. Recall that the important feature of a feedback
Nash equilibrium is that it veri¯es the time consistency property which cor-
responds to subgame perfectness (Basar and Olsder, 1982). Thus, we have
to solve the Hamilton-jacobi-Bellman equations, as in dynamic program-
ming, rather than the hamiltonian maximizing conditions.Then, the pair of
strategies (w¤;x¤) in the feedback equilibrium must satisfy the following set
of Bellman's equations:
½V1(I) = maxwfU(Ct) + V 0
1(I)[bw ¡ ±I]g (56)
½V2(I) = maxxfU(Gt) ¡ g(xt) + V 0
2(I)[bw ¡ ±I]g (57)
where Vi(I) is the value function of the two players ( Representative
consummer and Government); i = 1;2
Taking the ¯rst order conditions by maximizing the right hand side of
the equations (56) and (57), and rearranging respectively yield6
w¤ = 1 +
· ¡ ®








®· + b(® ¡ ·)V 0
1
(59)
Substituting (58) and (59) into (56) and (57), we obtain:
½V1(I) = ln[
A(® ¡ ·)
®(®· + b(® ¡ ·)V 0
1
] + V 0
1[b(1 +
® ¡ ·





®2· + b®(® ¡ ·)V 0
1
] ¡ (1 +
®(· ¡ ®)
®· + b(® ¡ ·)V 0
1
) + V 0
2[b(1 +
· ¡ ®
®· + b(® ¡ ·)V 0
1
) ¡ ±I](61)
The expressions (60) and (61) constitute a system of equations whose un-
knowns are the value functions Vi(I). Once these are found, it becomes
possible to derive the optimal equilibrium strategies by substituting the
value functions into (58) and (59). Let us propose the following linear value
function
Vi(I) = °iI;8i = 1;2 (62)
6Again, recall U(Ct) = ln[zt(A0 + It)(¡·w
2
t + (2· ¡ 1)wt + ·xtwt ¡ ·xt + 1 ¡ ·)] and
U(Gt) = ln[·zt(A0 + It)(w
2
t ¡ 2wt ¡ xtwt + xt ¡ 1)].
17implying that
V 0
i (I) = °i (63)
Given the formulation of expressions (58) and (59), only the Bellman equa-
tion (60) is relevante for determining the feedback Nash strategies at equi-
librium. We can ignore the Bellman equation (61) since feedback startegies
don't depend on °2. Indead, plugging expression (63) in equation (58) and
(59) , feedback stategies candidates become7
w¤ = 1 +
· ¡ ®







®· + b(® ¡ ·)°1
; (65)
We can easily show that our dynamic programming equations have solution
i® ® > · and ° > ®·
b(·¡®) since 0 < w¤ < 1
To determine °, we must substitute the expressions (62) and (63) in
equation (60). We obtain
½°1I = ln(A0+I)+ln[
z(® ¡ ·)2
®(®· ¡ b(® ¡ ·)°1)
]+°1[b(1+
· ¡ ®
®· + b(® ¡ ·)°1
)¡±I]:
(66)
As we restricted ourselves on local analysis, we compute the value func-
tion by using a linear aprroximation method8 around the steady state value






®· + b(® ¡ ·)°
:
(67)
The steady state value Is can be deduced from the law of motion (3)
and the expression (58). Then, we can easily show that Is depends on °






®· + b(® ¡ ·)°
) (68)
7In the following lines, we remove the subscript one to the weight ° even if for the rest
of the work we keep in mind that ° means °1.
8See appendix 1 for more details





b½A0(· ¡ ®)° ¡ b(· ¡ ®)






The Left Hand Side of this expression can be formulated as a function
of ° as follows:
P(°) = A° +
B° + H
C° + D




± ;B = b½A0(· ¡ ®);C = b±®A0(® ¡ ·);D = ±®A0·
E = b
±A0 + Log[z(® ¡ ·)2];F = ®2·;G = b®(® ¡ ·) and H = ¡b(· ¡ ®)





b(·¡®). Recall that ° is the ¯rst derivative of the value function
with respect to state variable corresponding to the costate variable. In our
case, we impose a nonnegativity restriction on °. Thus, the above implies
that ° 2 [0;+1[.
Proposition 3: For any ° 2]0;+1[, the game displays multiple feed-
back Nash equilibria corresponding to linear Markov Subgame perfect equi-
libria.
Proof. To prove existence of multiple feedback equilibria, it is conve-
nient to use again the intermediate values and bijection theorems to refute
uniqueness.








¡ ln[(® ¡ ·)2 + ln(®2·); (71)
lim°!1P(°) = +1: (72)
The function P(°) admits at least one solution if and only if P(0) < 0
and P(°) is monotonic. Let us check whether the monotonicity property is
veri¯ed. The ¯rst derivative of P(°) with respect to ° is given by
P0(°) =
b(A0b2°2(® ¡ ·)2½ + A0®·(·(½ ¡ ±) + ®(± + (· ¡ 1)½)) + ­
A0±(b°(® ¡ ·) + ®·)2 (73)
19where ­ = b(® ¡ ·)(· ¡ A0°±· + ®(¡1 + A0°(± + 2·½). The partial
derivative P0 vanishes at following critical point9
°¤ =







It follows that P(°) is non-monotonic. Furthemore, it can be easily
shown that the second derivative
P00(°) = ¡
b2(® ¡ ·)2(b(A0°± ¡ 2)(® ¡ ·) + A0®·(± ¡ 2½))
A0±(b°(® ¡ ·) + ®·)3 (75)
is always positive on the interval [0;+1[. Then, the critical point is a
minimum. Since the function P(°) is non-monotonic, there is a possibility of
multiple equilibria as it shall intersect at least twice the X-axis. We will com-
pute accurately these equilibria under numerical assessment. Once we ¯nd
the expression of ¹ °, we derive the feedback Nash strategies at equilibrium
from expressions (58) and (59). These policy functions can be rewritten as10
wFNE = 1 +
· ¡ ®







®· + b(® ¡ ·)¹ °
(77)







b(® ¡ ·)¹ ° + ®·
); (78)
Y FNE = z(A0 + IFNE)(1 ¡ wFNE): (79)
Since we can not explicitly compute the expression of ¹ °, we determine it
numerically. We distinguish two major cases. First, we impose ® = 1 and
we conduct a sensitivity analusis ·, and secondly, we consider any ® > 0
and we do sensitivity analysis of ®.
The function P(°) is none monotonic and may intersect twice the X-axis.
In ¯gure 5, we observe the possibility of having two feedback nash equilibria:
9We rejected the negative root because it doesn't belong into the domain of the function
P(°).







Figure 6: An increase in · (· = 0:1;0:3 and 0:5) will reduce both the weight
¹ °L and ¹ °H but with small impact in decrease of ¹ °H. For · = 0:1;0:3
and 0:5, the pair (¹ °L; ¹ °H) respectively equals (1.78; 114.43), (1.16; 113.79)
and (0.029; 112.93). At low equilibrium, the amount of e®ort individuals
devote to civil society actions increases while it remains constant at high
equilibrium.
a low equilibrium associated with small ¹ ° and high one linked to high value
of ¹ ° (Henceforth, ¹ °L and ¹ °H)
When consumers choose the low (high) equilibrium as the best value of
the objective function, they devote less (high) e®ort to improving institu-
tions. We observe that a positive shock on · induces the civil society to
increase its monitoring e®ort to ¯ght against corruption at both two steady
state levels. Furthermore, we observe an increase in institutional quality
index while output increases at low equilibrium and decreases at high equi-
librium. Total factor productivity e®ects dominate in the ¯rst situation and
are dominated in the second one (see table 5 in appendix).
When we take any positive value of ®, it is also possible to have multiple
feedback Nash equilibria. Namely, two feedback nash equilibria shall arise
since the function P(°) will intersect twice the X-axis. This is depicted in
¯gure 6.
As ® increases, optimal values of civil monitoring e®ort and institu-
tional index decrease for both two scenarios. In contrast, optimal output at
low feedback equilibrium increases and decreases at high steady state. To-
tal factor productivity e®ects dominate the direct detrimental e®ect at low
equilibrium and are dominated at high equilibrium. Governmental hostility
decreases (See table 6 in the appendix).




Figure 7: An increase in ® ( ® = 0:2;0:4 and 1) increases both the weight ¹ °L
and ¹ °H. ¹ °L is near the origin. For ® = 0:2;0:4;1, the pair (¹ °L, ¹ °H) is equiv-
alent to (1.63; 112.96), (1.74; 113.97) and (1.78; 114.43) respectively. The
civil monitoring e®ort associated to ¹ °L decreases while the one associated
to ¹ °H remains unchanged.
best equilibrium corresponds to the one which have high value function at
steady state. After ¯xing ® to one or allowing it to vary and ¯xing ·, the
best feedback Nash equilibrium is the one associated to high weight ¹ °H since
V H
1 (I¤) > V L
1 (I¤). Hence, the best choice for consumer is ¹ °H despite the
fact she devotes almost all her time to monitoring activities. However, at
¹ °H the steady state value of the institutional quality index is higher than it
is at ¹ °L.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper has presented a simple institutional dynamic game under non-
quadratic preferences. In reality, preferences are not always quadratic. The
novelty of this work is that we can handle an important class of di®eren-
tial games under nonquadratic preferences. We demonstrated analytically
existence and uniqueness of both open loop and cooperative outcome as
benchmarks. By taking logarithmic preferences and using a linear approxi-
mation around the steady state, we have solved analytically and numerically
our dynamic game for linear feedback Nash equilibria. We found that multi-
ple (at least two) feedback Nash equilibria shall arise. In the general case, it
is hard to compare those solutions since the parameters taken into account
are not the same in all three situations. Nevertheless, we compared the eco-
nomic implications inherent to these three cases. under cooperative play the
magnitude of the civil monitoring e®ort is lower than the one in open loop
game. This in turn is smaller than the magnitude of e®ort associated to the
best feedback equilibrium. Total factor productivity e®ects always dominate
22the detrimental e®ect of individual's e®ort to production in all situations,
except the case ® = 1 where there exists a threshold value ¹ · beyond which
TFP e®ects are dominated. Institutions improve much faster under cooper-
ative scenario than in open loop game since the speed of convergence to the
long run equilibrium in absolute value is always greater under cooperation.
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24Appendix 1
Without loss of generality, equation (66) can be rewritten as
(½ + ½)°1(I ¡ Is + Is) = ln(A0 + I ¡ Is + Is) + Â: (80)




®·+b(®¡·)°1]. Assuming that (I ¡Is) is
small enough and the ratio Is







®(®· ¡ b(® ¡ ·)°1)
]+b°1 +
b°1(· ¡ ®)
®· + b(® ¡ ·)°1
] (81)
Substituting (68) in (81) and rearranging leads to the expression (69).
Appendix 2
Table 1: Open loop Nash equilibrium - Sensitivity analysis of
· under the case ® = 1
· w¤ = x¤ I¤ y¤ ¸¤ À1
0.1 0.3617 1.8084 1.2182 2.9110 -0.2123
0.3 0.4144 2.0719 1.2719 2.5580 -0.1380
0.5 0.5112 2.5560 1.2983 2.0917 -0.0943
0.7 0.6802 3.4009 1.1197 1.5869 -0.0944
Table 2: Open loop Nash equilibrium - Sensitivity analysis of
® under the case · = 0:1
® w¤ x¤ I¤ y¤ ¸¤ À1
0.2 0.3761 4.3761 1.8802 1.2356 2.8054 -0.2231
0.4 0.3652 1.8652 1.8262 1.2227 2.8842 -0.2318
0.6 0.3631 1.0298 1.8155 1.2199 2.9002 -0.2336
0.7 0.3626 0.7911 1.8129 1.2193 2.9043 -0.2341
1 0.3617 0.3617 1.8084 1.2182 2.9110 -0.2348
1.2 0.3614 0.1947 1.8068 1.2178 2.9135 -0.2351
Table 3: Cooperative outcome - Sensitivity analysis of ¼ under
the case · = 0:1 and ® = 1
25¼ w¤ x¤ I¤ y¤ ¸¤ À1
0.1 0.3292 18.8161 1.6461 1.1713 3.1816 -0.1977
0.2 0.3148 13.6155 1.5740 1.1470 3.3188 -0.2080
0.3 0.3010 11.8366 1.5051 1.1219 3.4613 -0.2189
0.5 0.2755 10.3745 1.3774 1.0704 3.7604 -0.2424
0.7 0.2526 9.7264 1.2630 1.0187 4.0759 -0.2678
Table 4: Cooperative outcome - Sensitivity analysis of ® under
¼ = 0:1 and · = 0:1
® w¤ x¤ I¤ y¤ ¸¤ À1
0.1 0.3428 108.4260 1.7138 1.1921 3.0630 -0.1890
0.2 0.3412 58.4960 1.7061 1.1898 3.0759 -0.1899
0.4 0.3382 33.6087 1.6909 1.1853 3.1020 -0.1918
0.6 0.3352 25.3615 1.6759 1.1807 3.1283 -0.1937
1 0.3292 18.8161 1.6461 1.1713 3.1816 -0.1977
1.2 0.3263 17.1932 1.6314 1.1665 3.2086 -0.1997
26Table 5: Feedback Nash Equilibria - Sensitivity analysis of ·
under the case ® = 1
· °1 °2 w¤
1 = x1¤ w¤
2 = x¤
2 I1 I2 y1 y2
0.1 1.7822 114.43 0.0022 0.9826 0.0109 4.9127 0.1107 0.0874
0.2 1.5093 114.131 0.0046 0.9826 0.0230 4.9128 0.1225 0.0874
0.3 1.1577 113.791 0.0073 0.9826 0.0367 4.9128 0.1357 0.0874
0.4 0.6879 113.397 0.0105 0.9826 0.0524 4.9128 0.1508 0.0873
0.5 0.0287 112.929 0.0142 0.9826 0.0708 4.9128 0.1683 0.0872
Table 6: Feedback Nash Equilibria - Sensitivity analysis of ®
under the case · = 0:1
® °1 °2 w¤
1 x1¤ w¤
2 x¤
2 I1 I2 y1 y2
0.2 1.6291 112.961 0.0143 4.0143 0.9824 4.9824 0.0717 4.9118 0.1692 0.0884
0.4 1.7453 113.975 0.0059 1.5059 0.9825 2.4825 0.0298 4.9125 0.1290 0.0877
0.6 1.7676 114.238 0.0038 0.6704 0.9825 1.6492 0.0189 4.9126 0.1184 0.0876
0.7 1.7731 114.308 0.0032 0.4318 0.9825 1.4111 0.0159 4.9127 0.1156 0.0875
1 1.7822 114.43 0.0022 0.0022 0.9826 0.9826 0.0109 4.9128 0.1107 0.0874
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